

## **The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Challenge of Effective Management of Internally Displaced Persons in North Eastern Nigeria**

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**Abstract:** One of the major problems facing Nigeria is how to manage the rising number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) especially in the North Eastern part of the country. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) which was established by Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999 is saddled with the responsibility of managing the IDPs. Despite the modest achievements of NEMA in managing the rising number of IDPs, the current humanitarian crisis in IDP camps in north east Nigeria has cast doubt about the effectiveness of NEMA in managing IDPs. This article therefore examines the major challenges which have militated against effective management of IDPs by NEMA. The theoretical framework adopted in the article is Structural Functional theory. The survey (personal interview) and documentary methods of data collection were adopted in the study. Data were analyzed using content analysis method. The study found that poor record keeping by NEMA on the progressive increase in the number of displaced persons in Northeast Nigeria accounted for acute accommodation deficits in the IDP camps in the area. The study also found that lack of proper coordination of the delivery and distribution of relief materials from different aid agencies by NEMA accounted for food scarcity and poor health conditions in IDP camps in northeast Nigeria. To this end, the study recommends that the Nigeria government through NEMA should enhance its data tracking mechanisms for IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria to ensure the availability of dependable statistics of IDPs in camps and host communities. NEMA and other aid agencies should also effectively profile all IDPs and conduct needs assessment for them before procurement and distribution of relief materials. The government should enforce existing legal framework and policy of oversight to ensure effective coordination of all interventions that would make for equity in distribution of relief materials.

**Key words:** National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

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### **I. INTRODUCTION**

One of the lingering problems facing Africa generally and Nigeria in particular which has degenerated into a major humanitarian crisis is internal displacement of people. The drivers of displacement in Nigeria are multi-faceted, complex and overlapping. They include Boko Haram insurgency, ethno-religious conflicts, pastoralists-farmers conflicts, armed banditry, natural disasters such as flooding, et cetera. The Nigerian government approach to managing disaster particularly, internal displacement of people, was to establish the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) by Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999. Its mission according to the Act establishing it is to coordinate resources towards efficient and effective disaster prevention, preparation, mitigation and response in Nigeria. NEMA has collaborated with other governmental and non-governmental agencies in discharging its functions. The Agency established Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in various parts of the country and has provided relief materials to victims of disaster. For instance, in 2006, NEMA evacuated about 1700 Nigerians that fled Mambilla Plateau and adjoining areas due to communal clashes to seek refuge in Cameroun (NEMA Report, 2006). Also more than 500 Nigerians were safely evacuated from trouble-torn countries of the Middle East such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia in 2011 and also in West African country of Ivory Coast in 2011 (NEMA Report, 2012).

However, despite the above achievements of NEMA, the advent of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, which started in 2009 and climaxed in 2014 and beyond, and violent activities of armed bandits have worsened the problem of IDPs in Nigeria. The frequent attacks and counter attacks from the

insurgents and the Nigerian Army gave rise to massive displacement of the population in the affected areas in Northeast Nigeria and created humanitarian crisis that attracted both local and international attention.

Statistics from International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) (2013, 2015) showed that the population of internally displaced persons in Nigeria increased from 1,353,982 in 2013 to about 2,152,000 in 2015. This represents an increase of over one million from 2013 to 2015. The total number of internally displaced persons across Nigeria as at 2017 was 1,700,000 people ([www.internal.displacement.org/countries](http://www.internal.displacement.org/countries), 28/4/2019). About 279,000 displacements were due to violence perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgents and military operations against them. Between January and June, 2018, a total of 417,000 people were displaced in Nigeria due to conflicts and violence (IDMC, 2019). The obvious effect of these massive displacements was accommodation deficits for the teeming number of displaced persons. NEMA and government appeared to have been taken unawares and therefore unprepared in making adequate provisions for accommodation of very large number of displaced persons. Host communities were equally over-stretched as there existed few camps for the accommodation of these IDPs. Ogunmorayo (2015) further observed inadequate and at times unavailable health services in the camps due to high number of IDPs.

The humanitarian crisis in IDPs camps has cast doubts on the competence of NEMA and its ability to manage effectively the IDPs in Nigeria. The objective of this article therefore is to examine the factors militating against effective management of IDPs in North eastern Nigeria by NEMA.

## **II. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION – INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)**

The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are a category of persons displaced within a geographical location. This displacement makes them to suffer several consequences as their means of livelihood such as agriculture and trade are wiped out as a result of violent conflicts or disaster (Ladan, 2011). Such IDPs often experience worsening situation of food insecurity and malnutrition, having been displaced from their means of livelihood. The United Nations Guiding Principles (1998) defined Internally Displaced Persons as; “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border”. These situations among others create the need for a humanitarian response.

The African Union Convention for Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009) also defined Internally Displaced Persons, in line with that of the United Nations Guiding Principles. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are therefore, citizens of a country who are displaced within the territory of a country as a result of natural disasters such as erosion/flooding, desertification, etc. People could also be displaced as a result of man-made disasters such as civil war, internal armed conflict, terrorism and so forth like the cases in Nigeria. In these situations, people are left with the option of fleeing their homes and natural habitats for safety. Durosaro and Ajiboye (2011) identified two major components of the IDPs, first, the coercive or otherwise involuntary character of movement and the fact that such movement takes place within national borders. As earlier pointed out in this article, the most identified common causes of involuntary movements are; armed conflicts, violence, human rights violation and disasters (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2009).

The second component of the IDPs is the movement within national borders. Since IDPs remain legally under the protection of national authorities of their habitual residence, unlike refugees who have been deprived of the protection of their state (country) of origin, they are expected to enjoy the same rights as the rest (undisplaced) of the population (Durosaro & Ajiboye, 2011). In situations of displacements, victims face untold economic hardship, psychological trauma and social dislocation. In this regard, they need the assistance of the government and other humanitarian groups that could intervene to cushion the effect of hardship in order to bring succor to the IDPs. NEMA was established as a federal government agency to deal among other things, with the issue of internal displacement of citizens of the country.

## **III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the Structural Functional approach as expounded by Sociologists such as, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim, Robert Merton and others (Mbah, 2006:307). This approach sees society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote solidarity and stability. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the functions of its constituent elements. A common analogy popularized by Herbert Spencer presents these parts of society as “organs” that work towards the proper functioning of the “body” as a whole (Turner, 1985, Urry, 2010). The core advocates of the theory are Almond and Coleman (1960) and Almond and Powell (1996). The structural functional theory revolves around the two concepts of structure and functions. According to Durkheim, society should be analyzed and described in terms of functions (Cosser, 1977). While structure refers to the arrangements within the system which perform the functions and/or roles; function denotes the consequences involving the objective

as well as the process of the patterns of actions and roles. As a branch of the system theory, structural functionalism addresses the issue of what political structures performs which functions in the political system (society).

The basic assumptions of the structural functional theory are:

- It sees the society as a single inter-related system with each element performing a precise function.
- If a society is a system as a whole, it has parts that are interconnected.
- The entire social structure has wide aims and principles, which are mainly observed by the members of the society to maintain equilibrium.

The emphasis of the Structural Functionalist approach on the inter-relatedness of several parts of society makes us aware of the fact that a change in one part of society, whether intended or unintended, affects other parts of society.

NEMA as a federal government agency is like other structures of government viz; ministries, agencies and departments. It is charged with the responsibility of handling humanitarian issues as they arise in the country. It ensures that in emergency situations leading to humanitarian crisis, including displacements of citizens, NEMA would be able to perform its assigned function to restore equilibrium to the Nigerian society. Thus in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria, NEMA was expected to properly handle the ensuing humanitarian situation to ensure the sustenance of the displaced persons and their eventual rehabilitation.

Merton (1957) made it clear that there is a social dysfunction referred to as any social pattern that may disrupt the operation of society.

The dysfunction of the political and economic structures of the country, giving rise to corruption, gross inequality, poverty etc, adversely affected the performance of NEMA just as it affected other structures that make up the Nigerian society. This explains why in spite of NEMA's intervention, coupled with local and international interventions in the humanitarian crisis that arose from Boko Haram insurgency, NEMA could not effectively handle the situation. The inability of NEMA to keep effective records of the progressive rise in the number of IDPs, led to acute accommodation problems in the IDP camps. Its lack of proper coordination of interventions of local and international aid agencies contributed to the scarcity of food items and poor health conditions of the IDPs in the camps. Furthermore, improper utilization of relief materials meant for IDPs from different aid agencies also accounted for the poor health conditions of people in the IDP camps. These are results of malfunctioning of the other structures in the country which had affected the entire Nigerian society. Thus if other structures like the Federal Ministry of Budget and Planning which has the mandate to serve as clearing house for all international aid agencies did not effectively perform its oversight functions on these agencies, it has serious negative effect on the performance of NEMA. Thus, the dysfunction of one structure affects the proper functioning of other structures, since according to the Structuralism approach, the proper functioning or dysfunctioning of any part(s) affects the whole and would give rise to the creation of other structures or functions to handle the disequilibrium resulting from the dysfunction.

NEMA officials had explained that NEMA's inability to effectively handle the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast Nigeria mainly bordered on irregular and under releases of budgetary provisions, paucity of fund, and the preferences of local and international aid agencies to operate through their branches and local affiliates in Nigeria (Daiti, 2016). This scenario is not peculiar to NEMA. Other government agencies had complained of under releases of budgetary provisions or under implementation of approved budgets. Paucity of fund is a common denominator in Nigeria and in fact, in other underdeveloped countries of the third world.

#### **IV. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NIGERIA**

The number of IDPs has been on the increase especially in the Northeast Nigeria. The major cause of the displacements was the Boko Haram insurgency, which increased in magnitude as the years passed by and climaxed in 2014, and early 2015, when the insurgents occupied vast territories in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. The number of mortalities and displacements continued to rise that NEMA was unable to handle the arising humanitarian crisis. A clarion call was made to the international community and philanthropic agencies to assist in the humanitarian crisis.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2014) had reported that, as at the end of 2013, there was an estimated 1,538,982 IDPs in Nigeria. Two years later in 2015, IDMC estimated that with the rate of annual increase in IDP population, about 2,152,000 IDPs were in Nigeria. This represented an annual increase rate of about 500,000 IDPs. This figure, according to IDMC (2015) report, was based on an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) teams in 207 local government areas covering 13 states of Northern Nigeria. The displacement assessment was conducted with key informants from local governments, wards and IDP sites (both in official camps and camp-like settings), as well as people in host communities. It was the report that revealed

that out of the total figure of IDPs in Nigeria, 12.6 percent were displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 percent by natural disasters and 85 percent because of insurgency attacks.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) (2014), reported that as at May 2014, there were about 650,000 IDPs in the Northeast, while in December of the same year, the number rose to 868,355 IDPs in the region (Inter Agency Report, 2014). The program of IOM had the objective to support the government of Nigeria through NEMA in establishing a comprehensive system to collect and disseminate data on IDPs by strengthening the capacity of NEMA and other partners in the field to undertake IDP assessment in a unified and systematized manner.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2014) reported that there had been steady rise in internally displaced persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, and was able to tabulate the estimated number of IDPs by year as they progressed from 2009 to 2014.

**Table 1: Progressive Increase in Number of IDPs in Northeast Nigeria; 2009 - 2014**


Year	No of IDPs	Increase by Year
2009- 2010	100,000	-
2010 – 2011	130,000	30,000
2011 – 2012	200,000	70,000
2012 – 2013	290,000	90,000
May 2013 – March 2014	250,000	(40,000) decrease
May 2014 – June 2014	436,608	186,608
August 2014 – December 2014	600,000	163,392,

Source: UNOCHA Report, 2014

Even though the above figures varied with the compilations of IDMC/IOM, the fact remains that these international organizations have some mechanisms on ground to keep track of IDP population in parts of the country. Although, NEMA had fragments of figures here and there on IDP population; such records do not constitute effective record keeping on the population and needs of the IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) (2014) had reported that conflict and insecurity in the Northeast region had driven massive displacement with an estimated 1 million people reported to have fled their home communities in 2014 alone. The on-going conflicts and insecurity prevent the international aid agencies from keeping accurate track of the displaced population as some of the displaced persons eventually found their way into safer communities where security situation did not allow for proper profiling. Majority of such displaced persons remained in host communities, as some of them did not even have the idea that NEMA had established camps for IDPs. ACLED (2014) graphically presented both the cumulative fatalities and the number of conflict incidents attributed to Boko Haram from 2009 to 2014 as follows:

**Figure 1: Violent Incidents and Fatalities Attributed to Boko Haram, 2009 - 2014.**



Source: ACLED, (2014)

The figures above show that fatalities attributed to Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast rose from less than 1000 in July 2009 to more than 14000 in 2014 (which was the climax of the insurgency activities). In addition, the number of conflict incidents attributed to Boko Haram rose from less than 5 incidents in July 2009 to over 60 incidents in October 2014. This progressive rise in the number of incidents and the resultant progressive rise in the number of fatalities over the period also led to similar progressive rise in the number of displaced persons in the Northeast Nigeria. This scenario tallies with IOM (2015) Report that IDPs' number rose by about 1 million from 2013 to 2015.

The IDMC, IOM and NEMA (2015) Reports also tabulated the statistics of the rising number of IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2016 as follows:

**Table 4: Statistics of Rising Number of IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2016**

Year	No. of IDP	
2009	100,000	
2010	130,000	
2011	200,000	
2012	290,000	
2013	389,281	
2014	868,335	
2015	1,846,999	
2016	1,913,213	

**Source:** Compiled from IDMC (2014), IOM/NEMA(2014) figures

The table and figure above confirm that there had been progressive increase in the number of displaced persons in the Northeast Nigeria between 2009 and 2016. The number of IDPs rose from a figure of 100,000 in 2009 to a whopping figure of 868,335 in 2014 and 1,846,999 and 1,913,213 in 2015 and 2016 respectively.

This cumulative rise in the number of IDPs, no doubt, posed serious challenge to both the Nigeria government, NEMA and the intervening local and International Humanitarian Agencies. The Humanitarian Needs Overview (2014) Report showed that the situation in the Northeast had deteriorated and continued to worsen with the growing number of victims. The destruction of social and economic infrastructures led to massive conflict displacement and violations against civilians. The report hinted that there were crisis-level food insecurity; access to basic services severely constrained, host community resources exhausted, acute accommodation deficits and acute health, nutrition needs in areas with little humanitarian access.

Datti (2016), NEMA's Public Relations Officer, stated that NEMA had provided support to the affected populations living in camps, liberated areas, and host communities and to the refugees across the borders. He however, admitted that the number of displaced persons was overwhelming, and that the humanitarian landscape was fast changing. This was due to the successes recorded by the Joint Military Task Force against the insurgents between 2015 and 2017. He further admitted that the crisis was crosscutting, multi-stake holding, multi-disciplinary and cost intensive endeavour requiring support from all stakeholders. He therefore appreciated the valuable support of local and international humanitarian respondents, including the UN system and public-spirited individuals towards overcoming the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast. The situation created a large population of those in need of accommodation and food in the area.

## **V. NEMA AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS**

Essentially the government is central to the IDPs' management, protection and provision of social, psychological and other material needs of the IDPs in any country. Unfortunately, the majority of countries in Africa faced with the challenges of IDPs, including Nigeria, had not shown much commitment, sometimes for the want of the needed resources to achieve the basic goals on IDPs as enshrined in the United Nations charter and Kampala Convention on the protection of the IDPs (Lenshie, 2016). Countries plagued with the challenges of IDPs tended to render humanitarian support in different forms; logistics, relief, financial assistance, moral support, rehabilitation, among others. This helps to ameliorate the challenges of the lack of access to water, food, sanitation, dignity, basic education, etc. to the IDPs.

According to Global Protection Cluster Handbook (2010), international human rights law imposes on government three major obligations with regards to ensuring the realization of the rights of internally displaced persons; these include:

- a. the obligations to respect the human rights of internally displaced persons, i.e. refrain from actively violating them;
- b. the obligation to such rights, i.e. to intervene and take protective action on behalf of the victims of internal displacement against threats by others or stemming from their displaced situation.

c. the obligation to fulfill these rights i.e. to provide goods and services necessary to allow internally displaced persons to fully enjoy their rights; and to discharge these obligations without discrimination.

This commitment places on government in Nigeria and its relevant ministries, departments and agencies the responsibilities to put in place effective measures and strategies to effectively manage IDPs in Nigeria. Thus NEMA, according to the Handbook shall collaborate with relevant agencies to ensure the adequate and comprehensive implementation of the National contingency plan and National Disaster Management framework including;

- i. establishment and activation of early warning systems;
- ii. strengthening of coping mechanism for community resilience against the hazards, and preventing possible escalation;
- iii. deployment of Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies targeting vulnerable populations and communities-at-risk; and
- iv. building the capacities of communities on participatory vulnerability analysis to enable communities develop their local emergency preparedness and response plans.

This is to be achieved through the policy on strategies for protection and assistance of IDPs during displacement which include;

- a. provision of relief materials and assistance in line with the sphere Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Assistance in all relevant sectors
- b. adequate development of the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF) by NEMA as part of the comprehensive Displacement Management and Implementation framework.
- c. mechanisms for coordinated management and administration of IDP camps.
- d. special protection and assistance provided for women, children and the elderly, persons with disabilities and persons living with HIV/AIDS.
- e. profiling of IDPs and Data Collection for planning of humanitarian assistance and protection interventions.
- f. mechanisms for prompt activation of local and international humanitarian assistance coordination sectors to respond to displacements.

However, this is contrary to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UBECA) program report that indicated that there is no policy or legal framework in place to oversee a comprehensive national response to the IDPs in Nigeria (UN, 24 March, 2011). The report however acknowledged the fact that Nigeria signed the African Union IDP convention in October, 2009. The truth of the matter therefore is that the Nigeria state is a fragile one, replete with lack of capacity, corruption, inequality etc that affect the implementation of most people-oriented policies.

NEMA's Head of Information Unit and Public Affairs, Sani Daitti (2016), had reported that there are currently 18 formal IDP camps in Borno State, seven in Yobe and four in Adamawa states, while there are 16 satellite camps in the liberated area of Borno. He further reported that the Federal Government through NEMA established cells in Maiduguri and sub-cells in Yola, Adamawa State and Damaturu in Yobe State, in collaboration with the military. This was to create access for aid workers to provide the much needed assistance to the IDPs and open a safe corridor for local people that escaped Boko Haram occupations and repentant militants to move into safely.

In order to facilitate the work of the camp management/coordination, NEMA established cells in Maiduguri. The agency also established sub-cells in Yola, Adamawa state, and Damaturu in Yobe state. The military assisted to create access for aid workers to provide the much-needed assistance to the IDPs and open a safe corridor for local people that escaped Boko Haram occupations and repentant militants to move into safety.

NEMA also set up operations offices in Gombe and Adamawa states to cater for the influx of IDPs and those taking refuge in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba states and also deployed its staff to Maiduguri and the sub-cells in Damaturu and Yola to provide support and assistance to IDPs.

Daitti also stated that NEMA set up operations office in Gombe and Adamawa states to cater for the influx of IDPs and those taking refuge in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba states and also deployed its staff to Maiduguri and the Humanitarian sub-cells in Damaturu and Yola to provide support and assistance to IDPs. To complement the efforts of the affected state governments as well as cushion the effect of humanitarian challenges, especially on food security and nutrition, NEMA has been providing food items to the IDPs in the camps. In order to ensure also the steady supply of these food and non-food items, NEMA, according to Daitti, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Borno and Yobe states in that direction.

NEMA has equally entered into mutual agreement with Adamawa State government on the provision of relief materials to IDPs. The agency also provided drugs to some major hospitals in the zones and deployed medical team and equipment to the Northeast to support the provision of medicare to the IDPs while providing working tools for IDPs with expertise in selected skills.

Daitti (2016) also indicated that NEMA has regularly received returnees from neighboring countries who fled the country due to the insurgency and presented humanitarian relief assistance to them. The agency also encouraged corporate and individual donors to provide support to the North East region by delivering humanitarian aid directly to affected states. NEMA is also a part of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative (PCNI), the Victims Support Fund (VSF), and the Safe School Initiative; all initiatives of the Federal Government put together to support IDPs in the North East.

Daitti (2016) further stated that NEMA has provided support to the affected populations living in camps, liberated areas, and host communities and to the refugees across the borders. He however, admitted that the humanitarian landscape has fast changed due to the successes recorded by the Nigerian Army with the support of Multi-National Joint Military Task Force (MJTF) in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents.

In spite of all that NEMA has been doing to address the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast arising from the Boko Haram insurgency, it has not been able to meet up with the urgent humanitarian needs of the IDPs in the area. The Nigerian state operating through NEMA lacks both the capacity and the resources to manage the high number of displaced persons in the country and to effectively coordinate interventions from international and non-governmental organization in attempt to handle the humanitarian crisis arising from Boko Haram insurgency and the attendant massive displacement of the populations. Furthermore, the inability of NEMA to effectively coordinate humanitarian interventions from aid actors had further given rise to poor utilization of available resources meant to address the humanitarian crisis in the area.

## **VI. CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF IDPS BY NEMA**

With full blown insurgency in the Northeast and other parts of Northern Nigeria, and with increased intensity of Fulani herdsmen/host community clashes especially in the Middle Belt, NEMA has been faced with several challenges militating against its efficient and effective management of disasters and the IDPs, especially in the Northeast Nigeria. These challenges include the following;

### **(a) Poor Record Keeping by NEMA**

One of the major constraints to effective management of IDPs in Nigeria is poor record keeping by NEMA. It is regrettable that up till 2014, five years after the eruption of the insurgency, the Nigerian government through NEMA, had no reliable statistics of the number of people being displaced on periodic basis. To compound matters, up to 90% of the displaced persons were located in unofficial camps, in host communities where proper records of displaced persons who came to the communities were not kept (Inter Agency Needs Assessment, May 2014). It was only in July 2014 that the International Organization for Migration set up a Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) to support the Nigerian government in collating and disseminating data on displaced persons (IOM Report, 2015). While government was establishing IDP camps in Borno and Adamawa states in particular, many of the IDPs in host communities preferred to remain invisible as a self-surviving strategy, meaning that NEMA could not capture their needs and number. Evidence from literature indicated that about 150 known sites hosting IDPs were identified, but only about 10% of the displaced populations were staying in these camps. The rest were staying in host communities, the coping capacities of which were under severe strains. More importantly, NEMA has no record of the number of this category of displaced persons, which formed the bulk of the entire number of IDPs in the region. The intensified insurgency attacks and counter attacks also distorted the number of displaced persons as this led to internal displacement within those already displaced. This situation further created the problem of keeping accurate records of the IDPs in camps and in host communities even to the IOM with its expertise in data tracking.

It was after the IOM intervention in 2014 (at the climax of the insurgency) that NEMA started having some track records of some of the IDPs, but evidence showed that the protracted nature of the conflicts was on itself a barrier to record keeping and data tracking for NEMA. The agency, therefore, relied heavily on the reports and findings of other organizations, especially international organizations, to forecast the statistics on IDPs in the area of study.

The differences in the statistics of some of the United Nations and other aid agencies also suggest that accurate statistics may be lacking, but at least, these aid agencies had made significant efforts in tracking the data of IDP population in Nigeria. The tracking aided them significantly in conducting needs assessments of the IDPs and enabled supply of relief materials in the area. Added to the problem of lack of capacity on the part of NEMA to keep accurate records of the progressive increase in the number of IDPs was the problem of insecurity. Insecurity restricted humanitarian access, particularly in areas under the control of the insurgents. Security situation also remained highly volatile in some parts of the Northeast. NEMA could not easily access these frequently attacked areas by insurgents.

**(b) Poor Coordination of Delivery and Distribution of Relief Materials from other Federal Government Agencies and non-state actors.**

There is no doubt that poor coordination of delivery and distribution of relief materials from other federal government agencies and non-state actors is another major constraint to effective management of IDPs by NEMA. It has been the desire of government to ensure that these aid agencies were properly coordinated for efficient and effective service delivery, but this idea had not materialized. Daitti, NEMA's Public Relations Officer had reported that in 2014, the Humanitarian Coordination Forum (HCF) consisting of relevant federal government agencies, United Nations agencies and International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) was adopted both at national and state levels. The forum was to meet once a month under the coordination of NEMA to analyze and proffer solutions to humanitarian situation at each point in time and to ensure effective service delivery. There was a platform for coordinating efforts of all humanitarian actors and daily administration at the camps (camp coordination and camp management) (Daitti, 2016).

Notwithstanding the above efforts, NEMA could not firmly establish coordination of the humanitarian activities of both the other federal government agencies and non-state actors involved in humanitarian interventions in the Northeast. NEMA could only in 2014 sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state governments to ensure the steady supply of food and non-food items and for the provision of reliefs to IDPs. One therefore wonders why in spite of all these supposed arrangements on ground, there were still reports of food scarcity and poor health conditions of the IDPs in the camps and host communities.

Several other international and non-governmental organizations had also made significant contributions in the provision of relief materials to the IDPs in the Northeast, including the UNICEF who had provided finances specifically for nutrition, healthcare materials, child protection, education etc. The humanitarian crisis in IDPs' camps attracted aid agencies and NGOs to intervene in the insurgency-ravaged region, especially Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. The following agencies/organizations have intervened in various ways in the humanitarian crisis in IDPs camps in Northeast Nigeria:

**Table 5: Humanitarian Interventions in Northeast Nigeria by Local/International Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

S/N	Name of Agency/NGO	Year of Commencement of Intervention	Areas of Humanitarian Interventions
1.	United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF)	2012	Cared for displaced children in official and non-official camps and settlements in Maiduguri, Monguno, Bama, Dikwa and Damboa; treated severe acute malnutrition in children, diarrhea, malaria, measles and other childhood killer diseases, erection of tents in IDP camps.
2.	Medecin Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders) Skillful in penetrating dangerous zones due to its known neutrality in conflict situation	2014	Medicine and nutritional support to IDPs, treatment of acute malnutrition in children/infants, established 100-bed inpatient therapeutic feeding centre in Gwange, near Maiduguri operated an ambulatory therapeutic feeding centre in the General Hospital in Dikwa, Monguno and other places.
3.	United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)	2014	Provided portable water, sunk boreholes in camps and communities, and erected shelter, provided blankets and household items to IDPs, erection of tents in IDP camps.
4.	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Nigeria Red Cross Society	2012	Primary healthcare centres, regular medical supplies and equipment to IDP camps, set up nine mobile clinics, provided food items, training of NEMA/SEMA staff in humanitarian management programme
5.	Kinjir Foundation Yola	2012	Provision of food items, medicine and clothing to IDPs.
6.	Caritas Nigeria and Caritas International	2012	Education for IDP children, health services, needs assessment (health) food items
7.	American University of Nigeria, Yola	2012	Education for children, food items

8.	International Rescue Committee (ICR)	2014	Nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene
9.	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	2015	Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management Logistics Support and Relief Commodities Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Protection Economic Recovery and Market Systems Nutrition Agriculture and Food Security Shelter and Settlements (Food aid, food vouchers, local and Regional food procurement and cash transfers)
10.	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	2014	Data Tracking Matrix, Needs assessment, early warning programme, etc
11.	World Health Organization (WHO)	2014	Medical supplies and treatment of acute malnutrition etc
12.	World Food Programme	2014	Food items, nutrition, Agriculture and food security etc
13.	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	2014	Lifesaving items, food, water, medicine, etc
14.	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	2014	Lifesaving items, food, water, medicine, nutrition, etc.
15.	International Medical Corps IIMC)	2014	Medical supplies treatment of acute malnutrition, food items, needs assessment, etc.
16.	Medicine La Mode	2014	Medical supplies treatment of acute malnutrition, food items, needs assessment, etc.
17.	Premier Urgence	2014	Lifesaving items, food, medicine, nutrition, etc
18.	Refugee International	2014	Lifesaving items, food, medicine, nutrition, etc
19.	Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF)	2013	Food items, medicine, non-food items like soap, detergents, blankets, mats, etc
20.	Catholic Relief Service (CRS)	2012	Food items, medicine, non-food items like soap, detergents, blankets, mats, etc
21.	Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	2014	Treatment of acute malnutrition, food items, medical supplies, nutrition, etc.
22.	UN OCHA	2013	Needs assessment, campaign for fund raising to assist IDPs, early warning, life saving support, etc.

Source: Compiled from the following sources; UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, NEMA Reports etc

It is observable from table 5 above that these aid agencies intervened significantly and saved the lives of many IDPs in the Northeast. UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Programme (WFP), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) etc, were all prominently delivering humanitarian materials to the IDPs. Some of the above aid agencies registered with Borno state government as operating within the area. However, there is no evidence that NEMA or any government agency coordinated the activities of these agencies. Each agency operated separately through their local offices and affiliates. Coordination of the activities of these agencies by NEMA or similar government agency would have ensured effective delivery of these needed materials to the IDPs without overlapping or duplicating functions. But as they were, the agencies operated separately and did not take cognizance of the deliveries and distributions of relief materials by similar aid agencies and NEMA. This naturally led to overlapping or duplication of deliveries. Coordination would ensure equitable distribution of available relief materials at the disposal of all aid agencies including NEMA.

**Table 6: List of Registered Agencies/Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Borno State as at 2015**

1.	International Committee of the Red Cross/Nigerian Red Cross Society
2.	Medecin Sans Frontiers (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders)
3.	World Health Organization (WHO)
4.	World Food Programme (WFP)
5.	OXFAM

6.	International organization for Migration (IOM)
7.	INTERSOS
8.	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
9.	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
10.	International Medical Corps (IMC)
11.	Medicine La Mode
12.	Premier Urgence
13.	Refugee International
14.	Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF)
15.	Catholic Relief Service (CRS)
16.	Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
17.	United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF)
18.	UNFPA
19.	United Nations OCHA
20.	United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

Source: [icirnigeria.org](http://icirnigeria.org)

The tables 5 and 6 clearly show that out of the reported large number of aid agencies operating in the Northeast, numbering up to 100 (as stated by Governor Shettima of Borno State), only 20 such agencies were formally registered. Furthermore, even with those registered, there is no firm evidence that their activities were in any way coordinated through NEMA. NEMA itself through its Public Relations Officer, Sani Datti had revealed that most of the aid agencies had never given NEMA any money and had been implementing their humanitarian assistance directly to the IDPs through their local offices and affiliates.

On whether NEMA effectively coordinated the delivery and distribution of relief materials from different aid agencies, the NEMA officials that responded to the question explained that these other aid agencies not only provided relief materials direct to the camps, but also established and run IDP camps outside official government camps. They also responded that most of them made supplies direct to the camps and that international aid organizations preferred to make deliveries to the camps through their branches and local affiliates in Nigeria.

**c) Poor Utilization of Available Fund/Relief Materials**

As stated earlier in this article, the United Nations organs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) had intervened in one form or the other and had provided fund for humanitarian purposes. Below is the humanitarian funding by USAID in 2015;

**Figure 2: USAID Humanitarian Funding to Lake Chad Basin in 2015 (for Humanitarian Crisis by Boko Haran) which Nigeria is part**

USAID/OFDA	-	\$30,287,761
USAID/FFP	-	\$50,432,903
State/PRM	-	\$53,300,000
USAID/Nigeria	-	\$33,800,000
Total		\$167,820,664

Source: *USAID Fact Sheet #4 Fiscal Year 2015*

This funding covered such areas as;

1. Humanitarian Coordination & Information Management
2. Logistics Support and Relief Commodities
3. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
4. Protection
5. Economic Recovery and Market systems
6. Nutrition
7. Agriculture and Food Security
8. Shelter and Settlement

If the millions of Dollars as shown in the figure were properly utilized, one would believe that the outcry about the conditions of IDPs in the Northeast would have been minimal. Suleiman (2016) cited the governor of Borno State, Kashim Shittima as having once told a delegation that UNICEF and other UN agencies “will construct five toilets in Gwoza and fly in helicopters more than seven times to inspect the toilets, thereby

spending more money on inspection than on the projects”. The governor observed that millions of dollars were published by the United Nations agencies and other International organizations as having been spent on humanitarian assistance to the IDPs in the Northeast Nigeria and in the Lake Chad Basin, but major part of the fund had often been spent on logistics, which have no direct impact on the needs of IDPs.

There is evidence (icirnigeria.org, 2015) that UNICEF and other United Nations agencies operating in the Northeast, especially in Borno had not made the desired impact in terms of the utilization of available resources at their disposal. Citing UNICEF Factsheet, \$16 million was spent on treatment of 153,936 children in its therapeutic feeding centre in the three states between January and November 2015 alone. This was far less than half of the \$42 million it requested for the feeding programme. This implies that \$26 million was spent on implementation (or logistics) while only \$16 million went into the feeding programme itself.

Some aid agencies did not make proper utilization of their available resources in providing needed relief materials to the IDPs. In several cases, aid materials supplied by these groups were more of general needs materials like mosquito nets, blankets, mats etc, in place of critically needed lifesaving material like food items, nutrition, Medicare etc (Olawale, 2015). This had resulted in a scenario where the IDPs sold these items for pittance to be able to buy food items needed for their survival. These overlapping and duplication of functions amounted to poor utilization of scarce resources and directly affected the effective management of the IDPs’ needs.

It is also a common knowledge that despite the huge sums of money spent by the Federal and State governments on relief, IDPs continued to die of hunger in parts of northeastern Nigeria, prompting calls for the declaration of state of emergency in the area. This situation could be attributed to poor utilization of fund due to lack of oversight on the side of NEMA/SEMA. Unlike the international organizations working in the area, NEMA and SEMA rarely carry out any kind of needs assessment ahead of relief interventions. In this regard, Ali Gambo, an IDP Protection Officer for the UNHCR remarked that IDPs frequently received items they did not need and end up selling them for a pittance so as to buy essential goods.

Saleh (2016) noted that, as usual, relief interventions are made by governments, groups and individuals to alleviate the sufferings of IDPs, but that there were doubts about the transparent management of the humanitarian aids. This had arisen from reports of alleged diversion of relief materials from reaching the desired beneficiaries. Saleh also reported that NEMA delivered food and non-food items to the IDPs on a monthly basis, depending on the amount of funds available to it; that the agency usually hands over the items to states that receive them on behalf of the IDPs and subsequently released the items to the camps for distribution. He then suggested that the onus was on the state governors to investigate the activities of their officials with a view to clearing any suspicion. However, one could still argue that NEMA as the mandated humanitarian agency should properly exercise its oversight functions over the distribution of aid materials to ensure effective service delivery. But in practice NEMA do not carry out this oversight function and merely forwards aid items to the State Emergency Management Agencies, who in turn deliver to local officials to perform the actual distribution without due supervision from higher bodies. This may explain why most international organizations and NGOs prefer to reach the IDPs themselves than going through NEMA, which in real sense should be the appropriate thing to do to ensure effective coordination of aid distributions.

. The donations made between 2012 and 2017 included the following;

1. Aliko Dangote and others - N6.5 million
2. World Bank - \$800 million
3. UNDP- \$248 million, out of which \$24 million was released
4. USAID \$200 million & 160 metric tons of grains
5. Saudi Arabia - N750 million
6. Australian Government - N9 million

Source: Odufowokan, 2016

Apart from the budgetary allocations to these agencies, a number of state governments and other groups made commitments of resources for the welfare of the IDPs in the Northeast within the period. Orodata (2015) gave some insight on the cash and kind donations to Borno State government for humanitarian assistance from 2012 to 2015 as follows:

**Figure 3: Cash and Kind Donations to Borno Government in 4 years; 2012-2015 for IDPs Welfare**

A.	i.	Amount spent monthly on Welfare for the IDPs	-	₦600 million
	ii.	Amount received by Borno State Government from May 2011 to December 2015 (from Federal Government)	-	₦345 million
	iii.	Amount donated by Goodluck Jonathan’s Administration in 4 years	-	₦200 million
B.	Donations by States			

i.	Kebbi State	-	1,200 bags of rice
ii.	Kaduna State	-	N5 million
iii.	Gombe State	-	6 Trucks of Assorted food
iv.	Adamawa State	-	₦25 million
v.	Ekiti State	-	₦10 million
vi.	Ogun State	-	₦10 million
vii.	Lagos State	-	₦50 million
viii.	Taraba State	-	3 Trucks of Highland Tea
ix.	Ebonyi State	-	5000 bags of Rice
x.	Edo State	-	₦25 million

Source: Orodata, Accessed at [itpulse.com.ng](http://itpulse.com.ng)

The Borno State government which is the centre of the humanitarian services to IDPs in the area, claimed that its monthly expenses on the welfare of the IDPs was N600 million. The state received N345 million from the Federal government from May 2011 to December 2015, and the Jonathan Administration donated N200 million within the same period. If the claim of Borno State government to be spending about N600 million monthly on IDPs is true, the above fund releases, definitely could achieve little in addressing the humanitarian crisis the IDPs have been facing.

The continued outcry in the media that IDPs had continued to suffer appalling poverty despite the enormous resources invested in relief efforts by the Nigerian government and international organizations confirm the insinuations even by civil society groups that NEMA/SEMAs were inefficient and condoned graft. Civil society groups had complained (Adams, 2016) that poor coordination and lack of oversight on the side of NEMA/SEMAs meant that traditional leaders, local politicians and officials of the relief agencies themselves were allowed to divert aids. There were also evidence of aid materials (grains and non-food items) being sold freely in the open markets in the host communities (Olawale, 2015). Thus the very poor condition of IDPs in spite of the huge investment on relief materials reflects the impecunious conditions millions of Nigerians live, showing a wide gap of commitment to the welfare, security and rehabilitation of IDPs from federal and state authorities. Therefore, when funds meant for humanitarian services are diverted and misappropriated, it implies poor utilization of fund and this had negatively affected provision of basic health needs of IDPs in the camps.

This also confirms [icrinigeria.org](http://icrinigeria.org) and Suleiman (2016) revelations that some of the United Nations organizations and international non-governmental agencies spent more fund on logistics and supervision than on the main humanitarian projects they had embarked on. Utilizing fund in that manner made less impact on the IDP populations' critical needs, which were the very reason for the intervention in the first place. Effective management of the humanitarian situation connotes the proper utilization of fund to address critical areas of most impact on the beneficiaries viz; lifesaving items, health care and eventual rehabilitation of the IDPs.

## VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article examined the factors militating against effective management of IDPs by NEMA. Specifically, the article aimed at achieving the following objectives;

- i. determining whether poor record keeping on progressive rise in the number of displaced persons by NEMA accounted for accommodation deficits in the IDPs camps in Northeast Nigeria between 2010 – 2017;
- ii. ascertaining whether lack of effective coordination of delivery and distribution of relief materials from different aid agencies in the Northeast accounted for persistence food scarcity and poor health conditions of IDPs in the camps in the area;
- iii. determining whether poor utilization of available resources/inadequate funding accounted for ineffective service delivery of relief items to the IDPs.

The study found, using evidences from interview responses from NEMA officials, IDP focused group discussions, reports and publications of relevant organizations and agencies (NEMA, UNHCR, UNOCHA, ACLED, FEWSNET, FAO etc) and other secondary sources of data that;

1. The poor record keeping on the progressive increase in the number of IDPs in Northeast Nigeria between 2010 and 2017 accounted for the acute accommodation deficits witnessed in the IDP camps in the area.
2. The lack of effective coordination of delivery and distribution of relief materials from different aid agencies in the Northeast between 2010 and 2017 accounted for the persistence of food scarcity and poor health conditions of IDPs in the camps in the area.
3. Poor utilization of available resources/Inadequate funding also accounted for ineffective service delivery of relief items to the IDPs.

### **Recommendation**

In view of the above findings and observations, the article recommends as follows:

1. The Nigerian government through NEMA should ensure that it enhances its data tracking mechanisms for displaced persons in the Northeast to ensure the availability of dependable statistics of displaced persons both in camps and in host communities.
2. The Nigerian government should enforce the existing legal framework, policy that would ensure that all aid agencies involved in the interventions in the Northeast registered with government, and their activities effectively coordinated by NEMA to ensure optimum delivery and distribution of relief materials to all IDPs in camps and host communities.
3. NEMA and other aid agencies should ensure that they effectively profile the displaced persons and conduct proper needs assessments in both government established camps and camp-like settings in host communities before procuring and distributing needed relief materials to the IDPs.

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